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In Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
concluded that the doctrine of “separate but equal” had no place in public
education. That decision on May 17, 1954 initiated educational reform
throughout the country and was a catalyst in launching the modern Civil
Rights movement. Though Brown signaled the beginning of the end of de jure
segregation in the United States, events since reveal that – one-half century
later – the work is far from complete. On Friday, October 10, 2003, scholars,
students, and practitioners joined together at Saint Louis University School
of Law for a full-day conference to consider the legacy of Brown and its
impact on the whole of American society and jurisprudence.
This important and timely conference was
held in connection with, and as an expanded
version of, the annual Richard J. Childress
Memorial Lecture. This annual lecture is the
School of Law’s premier academic event and
is named in honor of Richard J. Childress,
who served as dean of the School of Law
from 1969 to 1976. Conference participants
enjoyed the rare opportunity to learn from
and interact with a diverse and distinguished
group of legal and historical scholars from
across the country.
William E. Nelson, Professor of Law
at New York University School of Law
and one of our country’s foremost legal
historians, delivered this year’s keynote
lecture. Professor Nelson’s work, “Brown v.
Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of
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Legal Realism,” addresses a shift in emphasis
in the jurisprudence of legal realism that he
argues is connected to Brown. A legal realist
rejects formalism’s belief that judges derive
decisions deductively from nonpolitical,
neutral and objective sources of law. Instead,
legal realists believe judges often rely on some
other rationale such as philosophy or morality
to reach their decisions. Professor Nelson
pointed out that, although legal realists have
dominated the jurisprudential landscape of
the country since the 1930s, realism has not
remained a stagnant concept, but has evolved
and changed over the years. He used a train
analogy to illustrate the shift that he argues
is connected to Brown: On the one hand, a
judge might see law as a caboose at the end
of the train, with the judge’s job to keep the

caboose on the same track as the train. This
type of judge sees herself as an agent of
society under a duty to make law conform to
the wishes of society. On the other hand, the
judge might see law as the engine at the front
of the train, with the judge’s job to determine
the direction the train will ultimately take.
This type of judge sees himself as a leader,
pulling society along in the proper direction.
In Professor Nelson’s view, legal thinkers
saw the law as a caboose up until the time of
Brown. Since Brown, however, the emphasis
has shifted such that the law is viewed more
as the engine, which, of course, carries a great
number of implications for modern American
jurisprudence.
Three distinguished scholars commented on
Professor Nelson’s remarks. The first of these,
Robert Cottrol, Professor of Law, History and
Sociology at George Washington University,
argued that carefully considering the forces
that shaped the Brown decision can help us
see that judges are themselves products of
the larger cultural system in which they live.
For this reason, it is important to consider the
cultural context of Brown in any discussion
of how the Brown court came to its ultimate
decision. Cottrol argued that it is essential
to look at the cultural and social forces that
helped shape the decisions made by the
Brown justices when deciding the case as they
did. Also commenting on Professor Nelson’s
remarks was Mary Dudziak, Professor of Law
and History at the University of Southern
California Law School. Professor Dudziak
noted that legal scholarship on Brown has
often isolated it from its 1950s historical
context. In her view, one primary motivation
for the decision was to safeguard America’s
position in the Cold War by restoring the
outside world’s faith in the United States
justice system. Segregation, she pointed
out, was a major focus of Soviet propaganda
as well as a source of embarrassment for
the United States abroad. Final comments
came from The Honorable Louis H. Pollak
of the U.S. Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, author of the seminal 1959
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
article, “Racial Discrimination and Judicial
Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler.” In
this 1959 article that served as a response to

those questioning the validity of the Brown
opinion, then-Associate Professor Pollak
had argued that, within the constraints of that
which has been decided by higher courts,
it is proper for a judge to draw upon his
“individual and strongly held philosophy.” In
response to Professor Nelson’s idea that law
is either an engine (in which a judge relies
upon something other than neutral principles
of law) or a caboose (in which a judge
eschews morality and merely follows where
society leads), Judge Pollak suggested that it
is possible for the two ideas to coexist.
Judge Pollak’s comments were followed
by Jack Greenberg, Professor of Law
at Columbia University Law School and
a former visiting professor at the Saint
Louis University School of Law. Professor
Greenberg has argued 40 civil rights cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court, including
Brown, and has participated in human rights
missions all over the world. He emphasized
that his recent consulting experience with
Columbia Law School’s Public Interest Law
Initiative on school desegregation for Roma
children in Budapest has helped to shape
his views on the role of Brown in American
history. Unlike the desegregation efforts he
witnessed in Eastern Europe, desegregation
in America was deeply conflicted and took
place in an inhospitable environment that
resisted a disruption of the existing political
order. As Professor Greenberg pointed out,
the historical contexts in which these two
segregation efforts took place help to explain
their very different results.
Conference activities also included two
very timely panel discussions. The first of
these focused on affirmative action and
featured remarks from Evan Caminker, Dean
and Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School and member of the
defense team for the recent Grutter and
Gratz cases; Joel K. Goldstein, Associate
Dean of Faculty and Professor at Saint Louis
University School of Law; and William
LaPiana, Professor of Wills, Trusts, and
Estates at New York Law School. Drawing
upon his unique personal experience as a
member of the defense litigation team for
the two cases, Dean Caminker emphasized
that – like Brown – the Grutter and Gratz

cases were part of a carefully created legal
campaign to end the use of affirmative
action strategies in higher education. He
went on to explain several key weaknesses
in Plaintiff’s litigation strategy. Importantly,
Grutter and Gratz recognize a significantly
broader rationale for using racial preferences
than the Court had previously recognized.
Professor Goldstein argued that this expanded
rationale will likely make it easier to defend
affirmative action policies in the future and
may affect how we think about the role of
racial preferences in American society. In
the view of Dean Caminker and Professor
Goldstein, the Grutter and Gratz decisions
bring us one step closer to the society that the
Brown court envisioned.
The affirmative action discussion also
focused on the ways in which the LSAT
marked an important advance in promoting
diversity in legal education. Professor
LaPiana explained that the pool of potential
law school applicants increased drastically
after the Second World War, in part as a result
of the fact that veterans could take advantage
of financial aid for higher education. The
LSAT was created as a means of allowing law
schools to sort out this increased number of
applicants in some uniform manner. This laid
the foundation for a professional class more
broadly representative of American society
than before.
A separate panel discussion focused
on aspects of the aftermath of the Brown
decision and featured remarks from Kevin
Kruse, Assistant Professor of History at
Princeton University; Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Assistant Professor of Law and History at
Washington University in St. Louis; and
Anders Walker, Assistant Professor at John
Jay College of Criminal Justice in New
York. Professor Kruse’s work focuses on
the ways in which segregationists at the state
level worked to thwart the implementation
of the Brown ruling in Georgia. He argued
that, in much of their legal and political
resistance, these segregationists insisted
that “forced integration” was an example
of the federal government imposing its
will on local people in abrogation of their
individual rights. Importantly, these statelevel segregationists were actually the ones

guilty of this very charge, as they demanded
complete conformity from Georgia’s white
population, constraining their individual
liberties in defense of segregation. Professor
Brown-Nagin’s recent work also considers
desegregation efforts in Georgia. Specifically,
she has studied the legal and social history of
desegregation efforts in Atlanta in an effort
to recover the full history of the landmark
Brown decision – in all of its complexity
– so as to understand the socio-legal
significance of the decision. She pointed
out that there was actually a significant
degree of dissonance between the goals of
the national-level NAACP and local-level
African-American Atlanta leaders, which
acted as an impediment to change in the legal
and social order of the state. According to
Professor Walker, Brown also affected the
structure of the southern political apparatus.
By examining the intersection between
Brown and the southern judiciary (including
both the southern bar and the courts), we can
see how the decision catalyzed innovations in
political and judicial technology. Professor
Walker argues that Brown led to changes
in the southern judiciary that made it more
difficult for NAACP attorneys to bring civil
rights cases, while at the same time catalyzing
the system’s modernization.
The legacy of Brown has shaped American
jurisprudence and society in many important
and fascinating ways in the nearly fifty years
since the Court decided that landmark case.
As the fiftieth anniversary of Brown draws
near, scholars and others will undoubtedly
continue to debate whether, as Judge Pollak
predicted in 1959, “the judgment in the
segregation cases will as the decades pass
give even deeper meaning to our national
life.” The important and diverse scholarly
work presented on October 10, 2003 provides
strong evidence that this work of deciphering
the meaning of Brown and its implications for
American jurisprudence and society is not yet
complete.
* The work presented at the 2003 Richard J. Childress
Memorial Lecture and Conference will be published in
a forthcoming volume of the Saint Louis University Law
Journal. Orders for the forthcoming Childress volume may
be placed by contacting Susie Lee at 314-977-3964.
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